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Abstract 
The claim negotiations are very important to both sides which have attended the engineering project construction. On 
one hand, the contractors want to cut down loss through negotiations and protect their own legitimate interests, on the 
other hand, the owners want to shift risks by it and reduce the project construction cost. The strategy and tactics of 
both sides are one kind of typical game form in the claim negotiations. This article firstly uses alternating offers 
model to describe the claim negotiations between the owner’s and contractor's bargaining. By estimating the 
contractor’s possibility distribute of retention value and the conditional probability of contractor’s biding price given 
under the assumption, the prior beliefs are revised with the Bayesian principle and counter-offer strategy is adjusted. 
Finally, the paper analyzes and uses strategies which have been considered the time value of money of each other’s 
bargaining to enable the claim event be solved effectively, of course enhancing the engineer project’s construction-
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Engineering change and claims in construction projects are difficult to avoid. Usually because of 
changes and claims involved with funds and progress, claim negotiations are always very difficult. It is a 
typical game form for both side of the project, but it generally has a certain distinction from Two-person 
Zero-sum Game. Because the parties participating in the game are not diametrically opposed and better, 
faster way to complete the task of the construction projects is their shared purpose. Therefore, analyzing 
and studying strategy and tactics of both sides of construction claim negotiations can make contributions 
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to an effective solution to contract disputes and improve the efficiency of the construction project. 
2. Time-limited alternating-offer game model  
The game in construction claim negotiations generally belongs to "Limited Two-person Zero-sum 
Game". This paper is based on the " Limited Two-person Zero-sum Game " model and actual situation 
and solution requirements of the engineering contract claim, which has adopted new paradigm to describe 
alternating-offer game for owner and contractor and finally applying Bayesian Rule[1] to correct beliefs to 
obtain a balanced solution.  
2.1. Finite Two-person Zero-sum Game 
Finite Two-person Zero-sum Game is known as "matrix game." The model is as follows: Let the 
playerⅠ have m pure strategies  1, 2,… m, with the S1represents the set: S1=﹛ 1, 2,… m﹜; and 
use S2 to stand the playerⅡ with the same pure strategy set: S2=﹛  1,  2,…  n﹜. The playerⅠ select 
 1 from S1 , while the playerⅡ chose  j  from the S 2, from which measures constitute a Board of a 
situation ( i,  j). As shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Matrix game 
  1  2 …   j …  n 
 1  11  12 …  1 j …  1 n 
 2  21  22 …  2 j …  2 n 
… … … … … … … 
 i  i1  i2 …  i j …  i n 
… … … … … … … 
 m  m1  m2 …  m j …  m n 
There are total number of m*n situations. If one of the playerⅠ wins a matrix A=( ij), then we denote 
this response as G and write G=｛S1,S2,A｝. 
2.2. Improved time-limited alternating-offer game model  
 In general two-person Zero-Sum Game, two participants are in a diametrically opposed position and 
one of whom is from the loss of another person. That is gains and losses of two-player zero-sum[2]. In 
construction claim negotiations, due to the specialty of construction, both participants are not mutually 
exclusive goals (better and faster to accomplish the construction task is the common goal) and are 
inappropriate to use the maximum and minimum (min-max) method or the general linear programming 
solution to solve it. The article lists the alternating-offer bargaining sheet and use Bayesian Rule to 
correct beliefs to obtain a balanced solution.  
2.2.1 Alternating-offer pattern shown in Table 2. 
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Table2. Alternating-offer pattern 
Alternating offer 
The players: Ⅰ——the contractors; Ⅱ——the owners. 
The sequence of the game 
0) Selecting the type of loss naturally. For example: large or small, the possibility of large loss is   and the possibility of small loss 
is 1 . 
1) The player Ⅰ offer 1S ;                    2) The player Ⅱ decide to accept or reject. 
3) The player Ⅰ offer 2S ;                    4) The player Ⅱ decide to reject or accept. 
5) .. ...                                    n) The player Ⅰ offer nS . 
n +1)  The player Ⅱ decide to accept or reject. 
Winning 
If the player Ⅱ accepted the offer of playerⅠ in the m phase, then the player Ⅰ win ( )c mu e  ; the player Ⅱ 
win ( )o mu e   . If the offer of the player Ⅱ is accepted, replacing the subscript on the line. 
2.2.2 Bayesian Rule 
In the process of construction project implementation, as watch-guard role to owner’s and execution 
role to contractor, the owner who always get asymmetric information often in the inferior position. 
During the negotiations, the owner should be based on contractor’s quote and historical and engineering 
data at their disposal, using Bayesian Rule to correct information sets and making a new offer to obtain a 
balanced solution.  
Assuming rational contractor and owner are able to predict the opposite side would base on the quote 
and regulate the information. That’s the players——the contractor and the owner are aware of "Two-
person Zero-sum Game rules" and both could rationally offer and counter-offer. 
(1) Calculating the probability according to the Bayesian formula: 
 
                             (1) 
  
Of which: The posterior probability )/( eRP i  when the contractor's offer is e and the retention value 
is iR ; while )(eP  represents the full probability when the contractor’s offer is e . 
(2) The retention value of the contractor estimated by the owner:  
( )
c i i
e R P R  ;                (2) 
The retention value of the contractor corrected of by the owner: 
( / )
s i i
e R P R e                (3) 
(3) Solving the owner’s effect function 
Effect function can either be linear or can be nonlinear. For simplifying the calculation, it is assumed 
that the effect function is linear, with a representation as bkxuo  , of which x indicates the amount of 
the claim or counter offer and write retention oe ‘s effect as ou . Then the owner’s effect function is: 
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1 (1 )
o o
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x e
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                                                               (4) 
(4) The effect function of the contractor estimated by the owner: 
Supposing the effect function of contractor is cu kx b   and the owner predicts the effect of function 
of the contractor is:  
max
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1 (1 )c c
c
e x
u u
e e
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
                                          (5) 
(5) Solving the joint effect function 
The link of effect functions of the owner and the contractor: 
max max min
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(6) Estimating the risk 
According to Zeuthen model[3], the maximum risk tolerance of the owner and the contractor is  
  ( maxoP , maxcP ): )(max cuu
uu
P
o
t
oo
t
oc
t
oo
o


 and 
)(max cuu
uuP
c
t
cc
t
co
t
cc
c


                              (7) 
Of which: maxoP ——the maximum risk tolerance of the owner; 
maxoP —— The maximum risk tolerance of the contractor; 
t
ccu ——The contractor's given offer in the round t , the effectiveness of the contractor; 
t
oou —— The owner’s given offer in the round t , the utility of the owner ; 
t
cou ——The owner’s given offer in the round t , the effectiveness of the contractor; 
t
ocu —— The contractor's given offer in the round t , the utility of the owner; 
)(cuc —— The contractor's effectiveness in conflicts; and assuming )(cuc =0 in the game ; 
)(cuo ——The owner’s utility in conflicts; and assuming )(cuo =0 in the game. 
(7) Calculating the concession rate 
If the owner’s maxoP is lower than the contractor's, the owner will get the larger loss in the claim and 
will make concessions. The concession degree will make the contractor’s maximum risk tolerance 
maxcP less than or equal to its minimum value maxoP
[4]. The concession rate calculated as follows:  
max ( )
t t
cc co
c t
cc c
u u
P
u u c



                                                        (8) 
(8) M rounds of bargaining 
After m rounds of bargaining, with one side's offer close to or identical to the other side’s retention and  
both accept it. The owner’s payment is ( )o mu e    and the contractor’s win is ( )c mu e  . 
(9) Finding Pareto optimal  
Calculating the sum of both effects: o cu u u   strives for du/dx .If u has an increasing trend and also a 
decreasing trend within the scope of the claim, there may be exists a maximum value, when in the vicinity 
of the final decision claim offer shall get the maximum value, achieving the Pareto optimal. 
3. Positive analysis 
A watercourse prevention project which was started at the beginning of December and planned the 
completion time was the end of May at the following year. When carrying out it, due to stock-ground’s 
lack of source material, the mining blasting obstruction from the around villagers, the Spring Festival 
holiday, snowfall’s leading to high-voltage cable drop and environmental protection and other reasons, 
resulting in discontinuity laying-off to postpone the project and originally planned project were forced to 
start at the high-water level which had been intended to begin construction at dry season, resulting in 
productivity slowdown. Therefore the contractor claimed with the following three reasons: 
(1)The owner provided insufficient material source and too thick cover layer and the number of 
workable block stone couldn’t reach engineering requirements and because of the substratum’s brittle, the 
acquisition rate of mining blocks after burst was not high. According to the relevant provisions of the 
contract, the contractor was entitled to get the compensation of period extension and adding cost. 
(2)In another yard stock ground, constructors and vehicles got continuous interference by the 
surrounding villagers. Therefore the work efficiency was affected, intermittent return to work after the 
project, resulting in the extension of the project. 
(3)The suspension order of the supervising engineer, the original project should be started in January 
or February delayed until March or April to construct. And the water-level’s rise caused the difficulty of 
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riprap which increased the duration of extension. 
When the contractor calculated the losses, the total cost of compensation was 10 million Yuan. 
After receiving the claim report, the owner and supervising engineer negotiated about the 
responsibility of the contractor and the undertaken risk. The actual loss was estimated at 500 million 
Yuan, which meant the owner’s retention value was oS =500 million. In addition, the owner evaluated the 
contractor’s distribution of retention value and the conditional probability of the given price under the 
assumption based on the previous negotiation strategy of the contractor respectively shown in Table3 and 
Table4: 
Table3: The owner’s estimating on the probability of retention of the contractor  
Assume R1 300 R2 400 R3 500 R4  600 R5 800 R6 1000 
Probability )( iRP  0.05 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.05 
Note: Adjusting the data in the table according to project case study (unit: million Yuan). Of which: 
iR ——The incomplete beliefs sets of the owner with the contractor’ s retention value, such as 
1R =300, 2R =400 etc.( i =1,2…n); 
)( iRP ——The estimating probability of the assuming set { iR } ,such as )( 1RP =0.05, )( 2RP =0.20 etc. 
( i =1,2…n), ∑ )( iRP =1. 
Table4: The conditional probability of the contractor’s offer under the assumption of the given owner  
)/( iReP  
Possible events 
1e 1000 2e 800 3e 600 4e 600 5e 500 6e 400 7e 300 
300 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.05 
400 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.00 
500 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 
600 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
800 0.40 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3.1. The negotiation process 
The first phase is the initial bargain. Contractor's first offer is 10 million Yuan. Taking into account of 
the current circumstances and the importance of the claim, the owner abated the price as 300 million.  
In the second stage: 
(1)The owner revised his beliefs in the probability of retention ( iR ) based on the contractor's bid and his 
own existing knowledge. The Bayesian Rule for calculating the probability is : 
 
 
 
 
(2)The estimated value of the contractor's retention is 
( ) 300 0.05 400 0.20 500 0.40 600 0.20 800 0.10 1000 0.05 545
c i i
e R P R               
After knowing the price, the owner would amend the contractor's retention value as:  
( / ) 300 0.012 400 0.094 500 0.188 600 0.282 800 0.188 1000 0.235 689.8
s i i
e R P R e               
6
1
( ) ( / ) ( ) ( / )
( / ) 0.235
( )( / ) ( )
i i i i
i
k k
k
P R P e R P R P e R
P R e
P eP e R P R

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
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(3) Solving the owner’s effect function and representing it as bkxuo  , which indicated x as claims of 
quotation or counter offer. Assuming the retention value ( oe )’s utility value ( ou ) as 0.75 (0 < ou <1). The 
effect function of the two key points had been award that the minimum value was (300, 1) and the 
retention value was (500, 0.75). The owner’s effect function is: 3min
min
1 (1 ) 1.375 1.25 10
o
O
o
x e
u
e e
u x

      

 
(4) The effect’s function of the owner’s estimation on the contractor. The contractor’s effect function 
could be expressed as bkxuc  and according to the owner’s belief revision and known two points of 
this function , that’s the maximum value (1000, 1) and retention value (689.8, 0.6). Setting the 
contractor's retention utility value as 0.6, therefore, the owner predicted the contractor’s effect function is:  
3max1 (1 ) 0.289 1.3 10
max
e x
uc c e ec
u x
 
       
  
(5) Solving the joint effect function. From the known effect functions, the link between the owner and 
contractor is as follows: max max min
min min
( ) (1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1.097 0.962
( ) (1 )
c o
o c o c
o c o
e e u e e
u u u u
e e u e e
   
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(6) Estimating the risk. According to Zeuthen model, the maximum risk tolerance of the owner and the 
contractor are: 875.0
1
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   Because the owner’s maxoP = 0.875 was lower than the contractor’s maxcP = 0.899, which meant the 
owner’s risk-bearing capacity was less and the owner could get larger loss in the claim would make 
concessions while the contractor would adhere to the original offer.  
(7) Calculating the concession rate 
875.0
01
1
)(1
11
max 





 co
ccc
cocc
c
u
cuu
uuP 125.0 ceu ; 125.0103.1289.0
3   xuc  46.318 x  
Therefore, on the second stage the owner’s counter-offer was 3.1846 million Yuan or slightly higher 
than the number. Setting the Counter-offer of the owner on the second round was $ 3.2 million. 
Accordingly, the contractor also estimated the owner’s retention value and adjusted the value based on 
the owner’s first counter-offer, calculating the maximum risk tolerance and determining the level of 
compromise.  
On the third stage, analyze and quote according to the same procedure of the second phase. After six 
rounds of bargaining, the contractor's offer was 5.23 million Yuan and the owner’s retention value was 
5.215 million Yuan .The two numbers were close and both sides accepted 5.22 million Yuan. The game 
ended. The owner paid for: 522
o
   million Yuan and the contractor won 522
c
   million Yuan. 
3.2. Finding the Pareto Optimal 
As we have had the owner’s and the contractor’s effect functions on the second stage: 
min
min
300
1 (1 ) 1
4 ( 300)o o o o
x e x
u u
e e e
 
     
  
 and 
1000max1 (1 ) 1 0.4
1000max
e x x
u u
c c e e ec c
 
      
 
                            (9) 
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The joint utility of both sides is: 0.25 75 400 0.42
300 1000o c o c
x x
u u u
e e
 
    
 
                                                    (10) 
0.4 0.25 3700.25 0.4
300 1000 (1000 )( 300)
o c
o c c o
e edu
dx e e e e
 
   
   
                                                   (11) 
According to the suppositions 500≤ oe ＜1000,300＜ ce ＜1000 and with no decreasing progressively of 
oe ,we could get: 0.4 0.25 370o ce e  ≥ 0.4 500 0.25 370ce   ＞ 4537050025.0200                 (12) 
0.4 0.25 370o ce e  ＜ 280370100025.010004.0                                 (13) 
The joint utility function of both sides in the claim price section within the existing increasing trend 
and another declining, the maximum value was 5.28 million, The two parties’ accepting value (5.22 
million Yuan) was close the maximum which basically achieved the Pareto optimal.  
4. Bargaining with the consideration of time value of money 
Because of the characteristics of the construction, the time value of money is particularly important to 
the contractor. Stahl and Rubinstein had improved the alternating-offer game model [5]. In the model, 
there is no restricted boundary for the frequency of offering, but each participant is provided with time-
cost, while the payment depends on the acceptance of offer and the number of rounds required. If the 
contract stipulates the claim is not resolved within three months after the contractor’s declaration, the 
owner shall pay the deferred interest of the claim and interest rate is identical with the same period the 
Central Bank’s which represents as i0. Due to less timely accessing to money of claims, the contractor 
have to take loans to solve financial shortage, or give up investing other profitable investment 
opportunities and its maximum loss is ci . It takes a month for the contractor to quote the price and the 
owner to counter-offer. The owner’s discount factor is )1(
1
0io 
 and the contractor's is
)1(
1
c
c i . 
According to the definition of the discount rate, we get 0i ≤ ci  and so o ≥ c . If the owner accepted the 
contractor's offer in the m period, the owner win o me   and the contractor get
m
c c me  , which 
predicates the nature of time value of money has affected both sides’ decision-making. On the third 
period, let the contractor's offer as 3e  and if the owner accept it, then the owner get - 3e and the 
contractor’s win would be 3 3c e . If the owner do not accept it and counter-offer it to 4e , having 4oe ＜
3e (given 4oe ＞ 3e ,the owner would rather accept 3e ) and if the contractor would accept it, the 
contractor win 4 4c e . Because 
4
4c e =
3
4c ce  ≤
3
4c oe  ＜
3
3c e , the payment received at the fourth round of 
the contractor is less than the third round, so the contractor will adjust the offer of the third round, 
making 4oe ＞ 3e . The owner predict the response of the contractor and will bargain as 2e ≥ 3e in the 
second round , making the contractor win 
2
2c c
e  ≥
2
3c
e ＞
3
3c
e . If the contractor predicts the result, he 
would make the owner pay for 1e ≥ 2e in the initial offer, that’s 1e ＜ 2e . So the best strategy for the 
contractor is to quote the actual loss price at the first offer according to the practice to solve the problem 
as soon as possible to obtain claim price. Various stages of the bid prices are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. The offer in the claim game 
Phases Owners to pay The contractor's payment Bidder 
The first round 
1e  1ce  Contractor 
The second round 
2e  
2
2c e  Owner 
The third round 
3e  
3
3c e  Contractor 
The fourth round 
4e  
4
4c e  Owner 
Therefore, taking into account of the time value of money in the claim game will shorten the time to 
make the negotiations and claims faster to be solved. 
5. Conclusion 
In construction claim negotiations, Bargaining Model and Bayesian Rule are used to analyze the claim 
negotiation process dynamically, which more reasonably solves the problems existed in the claims and 
makes the amount of the claim approach to the actual loss as nearly as possible. Taking into account of 
the time value of money is favorable to solve the claim events reasonably and quickly, and also make 
benefits to improve the whole country’s project management level. 
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